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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, the applied contract theory literature has paid a 
great deal of attention to the analysis of the strategic value of contrac-
tual incompleteness for the optimal design of industry relationships. 
In particular, in contrast to existing models arguing in favor of verti-
cal price restrictions as monitoring tools, several recent studies have 
shown that the exploitation of agreements which remain silent on some 
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(verifiable) relationship-specific measures can improve upon the com-
plete contracting scenario by positively influencing the market perfor-
mance of competing vertical hierarchies (e.g., Martimort and Piccolo, 
2010; Kastl et al., 2011)1. 
The present paper aims at contributing to the analysis of the strategic 
value of incomplete contracts by focusing on their screening efficacy in 
a class of (competing) vertical inter-firm relationships, such as manufac-
turer-retailer ones, where contracting may suffer from both adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard issues. Our focus on this particular market struc-
ture is motivated by different sets of empirical findings. A first one is 
concerned with the highly incomplete nature of business contractual rela-
tionships within vertically related firms (e.g., Lafontaine and Slade, 1997, 
2010). Different studies have also documented the relevance of demand-
enhancing activities of retailers (such as promotional expenditures) and 
their role in price determination in competitive settings (e.g., Chevalier et 
al., 2003), which creates room for moral hazard issues. The nature of con-
tracts stipulated between vertically related firms is also arguably affected 
by several external factors – such as upstream competitive pressure, 
retailers’ resource constraints, multi-market retailing activities – which 
ultimately shape retailers’ incentives to participation in agency relation-
ships. More generally, the existence of a direct correlation between retail-
ers’ performances and their outside opportunities can be regarded as a 
generic feature of vertical contracting in most circumstances of interest 
(e.g., Acconcia et al., 2008). Despite its potentially non-negligible impact on 
the design of optimal contracts, the interplay between the (endogenous) 
degree of contractual completeness and the screening role of alternative 
sets of rules governing the terms of trade have been largely neglected in 
the literature. This lack of interest might be due to the generic tenet that 
a (sufficiently) complete contract, which endows the producer with multi-
ple instruments to control the downstream agent, is more likely to favor 
truthful revelation of private information and hence provide an efficient 
solution to the asymmetric information issue. 
1 In these studies, the term hierarchy is employed to label a vertical agency relation-
ship in which a downstream agent has to deal with an independent upstream sup-
plier. Notably, this terminology diverges from the dichotomous view of markets and 
hierarchically organized firms (e.g., Williamson, 1975). We stick to Martimort and 
Piccolo (2010)’s terminology throughout our analysis.
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The analysis developed in this paper offers a simple argument against this 
conjecture when countervailing incentives matter in vertical contract-
ing. Specifically, we establish that incomplete (less complete) contracts 
may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon in market structures character-
ized by (horizontal) externalities across downstream competitors. While 
affecting the principal’s control over the agent’s conduct, the endogenous 
choice of contractual regimes crucially alters the basic rent extraction-effi-
ciency trade-off as it qualifies the interactions between alternative incen-
tive schemes (and the associated agency costs) and the contract-induced 
optimal market behavior of retailers. Our main result is to show that the 
standard second-best contract which remains silent on retail prices always 
induces self-selection and hence fully separating outcomes, irrespective of 
the agent’s actual misreporting incentives, whereas a more complete one 
may well fail in this respect. 
The intuition behind this counterintuitive result is as follows. It is well-
known that the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and rent extrac-
tion in agency problems leads to distortions with respect to the first best 
equilibrium allocations (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Baron and Besanko, 1984; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Caillaud and Hermalin, 2000). In the context of 
vertically related firms, the producer’s decision to delegate a given task to 
an independent retailer is typically rationalized by the superior knowl-
edge and expertise that the latter exhibits with respect to the peculiar fea-
tures of the downstream market. On the other hand, however, the same 
elements, along with the existence of asymmetric information on the 
actual production structure of retailers, typically generates informational 
rents for the latter which must be accounted for within the delegation 
arrangement. The basic idea underlying the alleged superiority of com-
plete contracts in this respect is that only detailed agreements, which are 
able to control for (almost) all the specific contingencies relevant to the 
transaction, allow the principal to curb agents’ discretion and properly 
steer both behavior and revelation strategies. This presumption, however, 
has been invalidated by several studies showing that, when at least one of 
the relevant variables for the transaction cannot be explicitly accounted 
for – since not observable by both the parties involved and/or verifiable 
by a third one – in the contract, the adoption of complete arrangements 
does not offer an efficient solution to the problems arising from the asym-
metric distribution of information (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1992; 
Bernheim and Whinston, 1998). 
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The same conclusion applies, a fortiori, when the agent (retailer) is act-
ing in a (imperfectly) competitive market. In these circumstances, the 
employment of an inclusive agreement would adversely affect the abil-
ity of retailers to efficiently react to his competitor’s decisions and, 
more generally, to possible changes in the market environment2. In 
this setting, the possibility to incur losses in terms of profits or mar-
ket share(s) because of inefficient contractual impositions generates an 
incentive to falsely reveal private information with the aim of seizing 
the informational rent and (partially) narrowing the expected adverse 
outcome. When, by contrast, the agent enjoys greater discretion as 
granted by the contractual agreement and has a residual claim on the 
(net) profits from selling, the ability to engage properly in competitive 
behavior creates stronger incentives to truthful information disclo-
sure. Under these circumstances, fewer (binding) incentive compatibil-
ity requirements will enter the second best contract and the result-
ing equilibrium allocation will be characterized by a weaker distortion 
with respect to the adoption of (more) complete contracts, which may 
rather fail to ensure self-selection. 
The present paper addresses these issues within an agency framework 
which captures the relationship between a manufacturer (principal) 
which produces an intermediate good in an upstream market and a 
retailer (agent) that sells the same good in a downstream market where 
he competes with a vertically integrated structure. Retailers possess pri-
vate knowledge about the uncertain downstream demand(s), which is 
payoff-relevant (adverse selection problem), while the agent in the hier-
archy retains the right of engaging in unverifiable demand-enhancing 
activities (moral hazard problem). Optimal contracts are of two alter-
native forms, that differ with respect to the number of variables over 
which the principal holds direct and/or indirect control through con-
tractual prescriptions. Under Quantity Fixing (QF), the manufacturer 
imposes the achievement of specific sales targets on his partner. As a 
consequence, the agent is left free to set the selling price in the retail 
market and can exert an optimal (payoff maximizing) level of effort. 
With Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, by contrast, the principal 
2 In this respect, Rey and Tirole (1986) establish that, whenever the seller has superior 
information relative to the producer, imposing no price restriction for decision-mak-
ing in the market for final goods can warrant the latter a larger surplus.
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also sets the price to be charged in the downstream market, and hence 
imposes an indirect constraint on the agent’s discretion in terms of the 
effort choice. 
We explore the strategic role of incomplete contracts as a screening 
device by contrasting the self-selection effects of the mentioned contrac-
tual regimes in the standard two-type paradigm with those emerging in 
a more realistic setting, where both the unobservable types face an incen-
tive to misreport. The theoretical framework is modified by allowing for 
countervailing incentives that arise from type-specific participation con-
straints, which – in the same spirit of Acconcia et al. (2008) – are used 
to model external factors influencing vertical contracting. When the res-
ervation utility of the high-demand type agent is sufficiently large, to 
ensure participation in the contract the principal may be forced to offer 
more attractive contractual terms, which could overturn the losses that 
the low-demand type incurs in the current relationship should he choose 
to falsely report his own type (countervailing incentives). Hence, both 
agents can in principle gain from falsely revealing their private informa-
tion to the principal. As a main result we will show that, irrespective of 
whether countervailing incentives arise in the specific agency relation-
ship, QF contracts always induce truthful revelation via the standard sec-
ond-best contract, whereas RPM arrangements fail to do so under several 
model parameterizations. More specifically, when both agent types face 
misreporting incentives, only the QF mechanism is able to neutralize the 
high-demand ones via the strategic effect identified by Martimort and 
Piccolo (2010), which does not arise under RPM. Remarkably, this result 
holds true even when designing complete contracts is not costly for the 
principal, i.e. even when the two contractual modes are ex-ante identical 
at the writing stage. 
The remaining paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys the the-
oretical contributions that have inspired the present analysis. Section 3 
sets up the basic model, while section 4 revisits the equilibrium analy-
sis performed in Martimort and Piccolo (2010). Section 5 focuses on the 
countervailing incentives case. The strategic value of contractual incom-
pleteness as a screening device is identified and discussed in section 6. 
Section 7 offers concluding remarks. 
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2. REFERENCE LITERATURE
This paper is primarily related to the extensive literature on incomplete 
contracting, a fairly diversified strand of research that has allowed to 
successfully explore significant organizational issues such as the distri-
bution of authority and the financial structure of firms (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999, among 
others). Studies in this field generally depart from the standard princi-
pal-agent framework as a convincing theoretical foundation for contrac-
tual incompleteness, and often take contractual incompleteness as a char-
acterizing assumption for exogenous reasons, such as bounded rationality 
(e.g., Williamson, 1975) or costly verifiability (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1999). 
Other works aim at explaining endogenous incomplete contracts as aris-
ing from their formal nature (Anderlini and Felli, 1994), from the costly 
description of the underlying environment and parties’ behavior (e.g., 
Battigalli and Maggi, 2002) or from limited cognition (e.g., Tirole, 2009)3. 
In this respect, we remark that our use of the notion of incomplete con-
tracts as ad hoc restrictions on the set of feasible agreements focuses on 
less than comprehensive contracts which are on purpose (i.e. for strate-
gic reasons) designed to remain silent on a number of contractible fea-
tures. Notably, in contrast to the mentioned literature, our goal is to fig-
ure out conditions (if any) under which incomplete contracts may emerge 
as an equilibrium phenomenon even when writing complete contracts is 
costless and feasible. That is, we deliberately omit to consider contract-
ing costs to focus on the suitability of different contractual regimes –
which are then identical at the contracting stage – to serve as a screening 
device. While this approach is intimately concerned with the trade-off 
between contract flexibility and control over opportunistic behavior (e.g., 
Williamson, 1975), it offers new insight into the strategic role of incom-
plete contracts when framed into a non-isolated principal-agent context, 
where the choice of the contractual regime has non-negligible effects on 
downstream competitive behavior. 
The main theoretical reference of the paper is hence represented by the 
recent literature on the strategic value of incomplete contracts in specific 
3 Other references that analyze incomplete contracts arising in hold-up problems 
are Che and Hausch (1999), De Fraja (1999), Che (2000), Segal and Whinston (2002), 
Fares (2006).
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agency relationships. Starting with Spengler (1950) and Telser (1960), stud-
ies on contracting in vertical inter-firm relations have investigated the 
deep connections between the existence of vertical restraints and the wel-
fare properties of agreements between independent actors. The conclu-
sions reached by scholarly work in the area over the years are far from 
being unambiguous. Contributions showing that any type of restrictions 
imposed on downstream firms have the detrimental effect of hinder-
ing competition and creating substantial welfare losses, have been chal-
lenged by studies emphasizing the potential for beneficial effects of verti-
cal restraints for both the contractual parties and the consumers of final 
goods4. On a different account, several recent contributions have focused 
on the relationship between vertical restrictions and the degree of the 
informational problem which characterizes the relationship. Within the 
context of successive monopolies, Gal-Or (1991) shows that the provision of 
contractual constraints on price – relative to the standard unconstrained 
scenario – reduces the dimensionality of the adverse selection problem 
and help to improve production efficiency as well as consumer welfare. 
New interesting results have been obtained in this area by consider-
ing the possibility of moral hazard. Martimort and Piccolo (2007) com-
pare the (private and social) effects of the usage of contracts with vary-
ing degrees of completeness, and find that, although the manufacturer 
always prefers a more complete agreement, the effect of price restrictions 
on consumers welfare is ambiguous and depends on how the choice of 
contractual arrangements – via its effect on the agent’s effort decisions – 
influences the willingness to pay for end users. Kastl et al. (2011) comple-
ment these findings by challenging the view that vertical price control 
proves beneficial to consumers as it generates lower input supply distor-
tions. In contrast with the predictions of the standard theory of optimal 
contracting, according to which only a contingent agreement is able to 
replicate the first-best outcome, these contributions emphasize the exist-
ence of the counteracting role of contractual incompleteness in provid-
ing the principal with crucial strategic advantages that might overcom-
pensate him for any inefficiencies related to lower degrees of control over 
their partners. 
4 A widespread argument in this regard is that price restrictions prevent the phenom-
enon of double marginalization which is typical of successive monopolies, and can 
therefore improve the production efficiency of the transaction.
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The idea that the principal can take advantage of contractual incomplete-
ness to influence the agent’s conduct has received attention since the sem-
inal contribution of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992), who show that, in 
the presence of non-observability and/or non-verifiability of some of the 
relevant variables for the transaction, a greater degree of incompleteness 
may lessen the agent’s incentive toward distorting his choices in favor of 
measurable aspects of performance and at the expense of the more impor-
tant but not directly monitorable ones. In the same vein, Bernheim and 
Whinston (1998) argue that contractual incompleteness can lead to the 
adoption of more efficient choices because it promotes the functioning 
of the implicit component of the agreement and encourages cooperative 
behavior by both parties. 
Also the existing scholarly work on the linkage between the degree of con-
tractual completeness and the disclosure of private information differ 
from the present one in several respects. This strand of literature provides 
an informational rationale for the use of incomplete contracts as the lat-
ter allow to sensibly reduce the opportunities of renegotiation of the orig-
inal agreement, hence influencing positively the revelation strategies as 
well as the investment choices of parties (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990, 
1995). At the same time, contractual incompleteness minimizes the likeli-
hood of sending an informative signal to others on the relevant features 
of the transaction and of the market in which the same takes place (Dessì, 
2007). The basic idea behind these studies is that the amount of informa-
tion which is (directly or indirectly) disclosed with the execution of the 
contract increases as the degree of contractual completeness deepens. The 
findings of this paper point exactly to the opposite direction, as they sug-
gest that the use of less detailed contracts may foster the dissemination 
of new information in both direct (by encouraging the agent to truth-
fully report his private information), and indirect (by allowing ex-post 
deduction of new information on the agent via simple inspection of per-
formance) ways. 
The informative value of contractual incompleteness is underlined also by 
Allen and Gale (1992) and Spier (1992) in signaling models. In this context, 
a higher level of completeness can be interpreted by the agent as a signal 
of the principal’s willingness to shield himself from potentially adverse 
scenarios by sharing the risk with his partner, while incomplete contracts 
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may rather signal the willingness to bear any risk, which could be inter-
preted as a relatively low likelihood of negative events. In this paper, a 
screening model is considered, in which the designer of the contract is the 
uninformed party, and contractual incompleteness is exploited to induce 
truthful revelation of the agent’s private information, by relying on the 
need for efficient competition on the downstream market. 
The model’s predictions also differ significantly from those of Allen and 
Gale (1992), in which the use of contracts with missing contingencies as 
a signaling mechanism necessarily causes pooling-type equilibrium out-
comes, and hence prevents the agent from inferring the principal’s infor-
mation. Our analysis, by contrast, shows that less binding agreements are 
able to guarantee the separation of unobservable types at equilibrium. 
Another key difference lies in the channels through which contractual 
incompleteness influences the nature of equilibria. In Spier (1992), the 
degree of completeness configures a relevant constituent of agreements 
only for intermediate levels of transaction costs, since for extreme levels 
the trade-off between risk sharing and type reporting is addressed by the 
principal by means of different instruments. In our model, the informa-
tional value of incomplete contracts becomes relevant depending on the 
agent’s effort cost, as well as on the (private versus cooperative) nature 
of the latter and the existing relationship between the goods sold in the 
downstream market. 
Finally, our paper obviously refers to the countervailing incentives litera-
ture (e.g., Lewis and Sappington, 1989), more precisely to studies support-
ing the idea that countervailing incentives are not (per se) sufficient to 
determine the nature of equilibrium outcomes (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1991; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1995). In this respect, our paper shows 
that an important factor for the properties of equilibrium outcomes is 
the degree of contractual (in)completeness. This connection had already 
been analyzed by Acconcia et al. (2008) in a sequential monopolies envi-
ronment with a continuum of types. Focusing on the impact of the cho-
sen contractual regime on joint profits, the authors show that the use of 
less binding contracts can generate pooling equilibria because giving up 
on a monitoring instrument prevents the determination of type-depend-
ent allocations for moderate types; in this case, the upward distortion of 
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equilibrium allocations can entail an overproduction effect that mitigates 
the double marginalization problem. Our contribution differs from the lat-
ter on both the modeling side and the focus of analysis. First, as argued 
in the introduction, we explicitly consider (imperfectly) competitive 
markets, in which a market-related effect of contractual incompleteness 
arises. Second, since the core of this paper is represented by the screen-
ing performance of alternative contractual arrangements, we do not make 
any assumptions on the nature of contractual choice (cooperative versus 
noncooperative) and do not elaborate on neither (joint) profit nor consum-
ers welfare issues. Consequently, it delivers strikingly different results in 
terms of the ability of constrained mechanisms such as QF to support fully 
separating equilibrium outcomes. 
3. THE MODEL
The theoretical framework used in this paper is a two-type version of the 
model studied by Martimort and Piccolo (2010). Our benchmark results – 
those emerging under complete information and asymmetric information 
without countervailing incentives – reproduce those of Martimort and 
Piccolo (2010), once adapted to the discrete case. For the sake of complete-
ness, these findings are collected and discussed in section (4). 
Our analysis departs from that of Martimort and Piccolo (2010) in two 
main respects: first, while these authors mainly focus on the standard 
asymmetric information case with type-independent outside options, we 
explicitly consider the case of countervailing incentives, which are likely 
to arise in vertical contracting; second, given our focus on the screening 
role of endogenous contracts, we emphasize the relation existing between 
the choice of the contractual regime and the nature of the underlying 
equilibrium outcome. 
3.1. Basic setting and assumptions
We consider a simple retail industry consisting of two retailers R i
i
, = ,1 2 , 
each of which produces a final output using an essential raw input pro-
vided by exclusive upstream suppliers S i
i
, = ,1 2 . The output is to be sold 
in the downstream market where the retailers compete on quantities 
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(Cournot competition) using constant marginal costs technologies, for sim-
plicity normalized to zero. While R1  buys the input from an independent 
supplier S1  upon payment of a transfer determined by the latter, R2  is ver-
tically integrated with her exclusive supplier S2  and both produce as a sin-
gle entity. As in Martimort and Piccolo (2010), we label the vertical (non-
integrated) agency relationship R S1 1−  as the hierarchy while the R S2 2−  
relationship will be simply referred to as the vertically integrated structure. 
The election of this particular setting can be motivated as follows. On the 
one hand, introducing a one-sided manufacturer-retailer hierarchy ena-
bles to easily identify the effects of the asymmetric distribution of infor-
mation on the design of the optimal delegation mechanism, and to point 
out the trade-off between control and efficiency faced by the principal 
when determining the optimal degree of completeness of the contract. On 
the other hand, since our focus is on the role of downstream market com-
petition for the design of contracts, the comparison with a vertically inte-
grated structure rather than a competing agency relationship offers the 
twofold advantage of sensibly simplifying the analysis and allowing to 
quantify the impact of the contractual problem on the equilibrium allo-
cation, which in turn can be consistently contrasted with the benchmark 
cases of complete and asymmetric information without countervailing 
incentives. In fact, as our analysis will make clear, within this setting 
the distortion with respect to the first best allocation hinges on the one-
sided agency relationship, as the integrated structure is not plagued by 
asymmetric information problems and the competitor’s best-response is 
independent of alternative assumptions about the distribution of infor-
mation within the vertical relationship or about the contractual arrange-
ment chosen by the principal S1 . 
The system of (linear) inverse demand functions is given by: 
 p e q q e q q
1 1 2 1 2
q q q q r q, , , = + ( ) − ( ) + ( ),( )  (1)
and 
 p e q q e q q
2 2 1 2 1




 denotes the retail price level charged for product i  in the 
downstream market, with i = ,1 2 ; 
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 − q  is a common shock to demands, whose realization is private infor-
mation of retailers at the time contracts are signed. We assume 
q q q∈ : = ,Θ { } , 0 < < < ∞q q  and ∆ : = −q q q . With no loss of 
generality, both states are supposed equally likely; 
 − e  captures an unverifiable activity (effort) performed by the agent 
R1  to influence the demand for final goods
5. This variable captures 
a series of nonmarket activities – e.g., investment in advertising – 
that may affect the outcome of competition both directly, by act-
ing on willingness to pay of consumers, and indirectly, by influenc-
ing the market performance of the competitor. We assume that the 
level of e  is observable by neither S1  (the principal) nor the compet-
itor (the integrated structure), and that exerting a nonzero level of 
effort generates disutility i e
e
q




, y > 0 . 
 − s  is a parameter that captures the external effects of the agent’s 
effort on the demand faced by the competitor (e.g., Che and Hausch, 
1999). If s > 0 , the effort displays a cooperative value and therefore 
influences positively the competitor’s demand of goods; if s < 0 , by 
contrast, the effort adversely affects the competitor’s demand, while 
no effect arises when s = 0 . To guarantee that own-effort effects 
exceed cross ones in the competitor’s demand (2), we assume that 
| |≤s 1 ; 
 − r  is a parameter that measures the degree of product differentia-
tion: r > 0  means that the goods are complements, whereas r < 0  
defines substitutes. Under r = 0 , the goods are in no relationship 
with each other and the two sellers operate as monopolists. Again, 
to ensure that own-price effects are larger than cross ones, the 
restriction | |≤r 1  is imposed. 
For ease of exposition, given the two-type nature of the agency model, we 
will refer to the realized state of nature q ∈Θ  as the agent’s low-demand 
q  or high-demand ( )q  type. 
5 Since S2  and R2  are integrated, with no loss of insight it is assumed that the latter 
does not exert any type of effort, as in Martimort and Piccolo (2010).
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3.2. Incentive mechanisms within the hierarchy
We assume that the principal has two alternative contractual arrange-
ments available to set up the vertical relationship. We adopt Martimort 
and Piccolo (2010)’s convention of referring to a restricted mechanism 
as a Quantity Fixing contract, and to an unrestricted one as a Resale Price 
Maintenance contract. Under QF, the producer designs a menu of con-
tracts of the form { }q t1 1( ) ( )q q q
 
, ∈Θ , where q1  represents the quantity 
to be sold and t1  denotes the transfer requested for the furniture of the 
intermediate good, both contingent on the agent’s report about the real-
ization of demand q . Under RPM, the principal offers a menu of con-
tracts of the form { }q p t1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )q q q q
  
, , ∈Θ  , where p1( )q
  is the price 
to be charged in the downstream market as a function of the agent’s 
report about the realization of demand. We assume that both the prin-
cipal and the agent are risk-neutral, and that the former can credibly 
commit himself not to renegotiate the contract offer after the effort 
choice has been undertaken. 
A QF contract is less complete relative to RPM because it limits the set of 
screening instruments available to the upstream supplier as it remains 
silent on the retail price. In contrast, the RPM arrangement endows the 
principal with a twofold instrument to monitor the level of effort exerted 
by the agent6. Although more sophisticated, an RPM contract cannot be 
regarded as a complete agreement; as emphasized by Martimort (1996), 
every (secret) contract between the producer and the retailer is necessar-
ily incomplete because, while specifying the tasks of the agent, the com-
petitor’s choices cannot be contracted upon7. 
6 Since under an RPM arrangement both the retail price and the quantity sold to the 
retailer are dictated, the upstream supplier has direct control on the retailer’s effort 
level.
7 The model considers secret contracts: only the choice of the contractual regime 
is publicly announced (or verifiable by the competitor), while the specific terms 
of the agreement are known to the contractual parties only. Again following 
Martimort (1996), a version of the revelation principle can be invoked to restrict 
attention to direct and truthful mechanisms in order to characterize pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria.
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3.3. Timing
Once the contractual regime is chosen and announced, the timing of the 
principal-agent model is as follows: 
 − t = :0  the state of demand q ∈Θ  is realized and observed only by 
the agent and the integrated structure; 
 − t = :1  the principal offers a menu of contracts on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, which belong to the elected class (QF or RPM); 
 − t = :2  the agent either rejects or accepts the offer. In the former 
case, the seller obtains his reservation utility and the integrated 
structure operates as a monopolist on the market. In the latter case, 
the agent selects a specific item out of the menu contingent on the 
report q ; then, the optimal level of effort is exerted, retail mar-
ket (Cournot) competition takes place and payments are made upon 
observation of selling performances. 
4. BENCHMARK
This intermediate section reviews general results from Martimort and 
Piccolo (2010), which will be next used as a benchmark for our analysis of 
optimal contracting under countervailing incentives. 
4.1. Complete information
When the demand parameter q  is common knowledge, the agent enjoys 
no informational advantage irrespective of the actual contractual mode. 
Hence, first-best allocations will be type-dependent and yield the effi-
cient outcome of vertical integration. For ease of exposition, we let the 
superscript j  denote the QF (j = Q) or the RPM (j = R) contractual regime, 
respectively. 
1. The vertically integrated structure.
With zero marginal production costs, the profits of the vertically inte-




,{ } Θe q( ) ( )1  implemented by the competitor, the integrated structure 
solves the program: 
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2
: + ( ) − ( ) + ( )( ) ( )  ,( )maxq q s q q r q q








q s q r q( ) = + ( ) + ( ) .  (3)
The cross-effects of the effort exerted by the agent in the hierarchy and the 
quantity sold by the latter on the demand are captured by the signs of the 
parameters s  and r . Remarkably, the choice of the contractual arrange-
ment within the hierarchy has no impact on the reaction function of the 
integrated structure, which can then be exploited to derive the equilibrium 
levels of quantity and effort both under QF and RPM contracts. 
2. The hierarchy.
The producer seeks to maximize his profit, given by the transfer from the 
seller, under the latter’s participation constraint (PC). The constant (type-
independent) reservation utility is normalized to zero. 
The agent’s expected utility is represented by the revenues from sell-
ing in the downstream market net of the costs incurred to carry out the 
extra-production activities and to purchase the intermediate input in the 
upstream market. Specifically: 
 U p q e tq q q q q( ) = ( ) ( ) − ( )( ) − ( ),1 1 Ψ  (4)
while the seller’s PC is given by: 
PC U: ( ) ≥ .q 0
Under either of the contractual arrangements, the principal is faced with 
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3. Quantity fixing.
Using (1) in (4), the agent’s utility can be written as: 
 U e q q q e tq q q q r q q q q( ) = + ( ) − ( ) + ( ) ( ) − ( )( ) − ( ) ,[( ) ]1 2 1 Ψ  (5)
from which the following first and second-order conditions on the opti-






( ) = ( )1  (6)
and 




Making use of (5), the designed transfer can be expressed as a function of 
the agent’s expected utility to yield: 
P e q q q e U
Q
q
1 1 2 1
1




q q q r q q q qΨ
s t. . ( ) ≥ ,U q 0







q q r q( ) = + ( ) + ( ) .  (8)
Apparently, the quantity sold in the downstream market is a function of 
the demand parameter, as well as of the effort exerted by the agent and 
the quantity offered by the competitor, whose effects are governed by the 
existing relationship between the two final goods. 
4. Resale price maintenance.
When the selling price in the downstream market is controlled by the 
principal via the RPM contract, the optimal effort level can be readily 
obtained from the inverse demand function (1): 
 e p q qq q q r q q( ) = ( ) + ( ) − ( ) − ,1 1 2  (9)
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while the agent’s utility can be expressed by integrating (1) and (9) into (4): 
 U p q p q q tq q q q q r q q q( ) = ( ) ( ) − ( ) + ( ) − ( ) −( ) − ( ) .[ ]1 1 1 1 2Ψ  (10)
The first-order conditions with respect to price and quantity are given by, 
respectively8: 
q e1 q q( ) = ( )( )′Ψ
and 
p e1 q q( ) = ( )( ),′Ψ
from which we obtain: 
 q p e1 1q q y q( ) = ( ) = ( ).  (11)
The principal’s optimization program can be then recast in the following 
form: 
P p q p q q U
R
q p
1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
: ( ) ( ) − ( ) + ( ) − ( ) −( ) − ( )
( ), ( )
max
q q
q q q q r q q qΨ 
s t. . ( ) ≥ .U q 0
Then for any q ∈Θ , the equilibrium allocation under QF contracts is 
obtained using the reaction functions of the two competitors (3)-(8) and 
the first-order condition on the effort (6), while in the case of RPM con-
tracts it is obtained using (3) and the first-order conditions for price and 
quantity (11). We then have 
Proposition 1. Under complete information, the equilibrium allocation is 
not affected by the chosen contractual mode, i.e.: 








q( ) = +
− − −




e q j Q R
j j
1 1q q y q( ) = ( ) / , ∈ , = ,Θ






q y yr s
y yr rs
q( ) = + + −
− − −




8 The second-order condition is the same as under QF, see (7).
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In words, under complete information no vertical externality arises 
within the hierarchy, and the agent’s effort choice is always aligned 
with that of the vertical hierarchy formed with his own principal. This 
holds true irrespective of whether the downstream retailer is left free 
to optimally choose his own level of effort (under QF), or rather is con-
strained through a price-fixing contract (under RPM). Hence, no loss of 
efficiency arises from keeping the contract silent with respect to the 
price instrument. 
4.2. Asymmetric information
The asymmetric distribution of information introduce a vertical exter-
nality between the producer and the retailer, as the latter tries to exploit 
to their own benefit the informational advantage (superior informa-
tion on downstream market conditions) by implementing opportunistic 
behavior that might affect both revelation strategies and effort choices. 
As shown in Martimort and Piccolo (2010), the agency problem cannot be 
solved by resorting to more sophisticated RPM contracts because verti-
cal price restraints are not, per se, sufficient to disentangle the effect of 
the (exogenous and unobserved) demand shock from the effect of (endog-
enous and unobserved/unverifiable) effort choice of the agent on the 
actual market demand. Put simply, RPM arrangements do not allow the 
principal to fully extract the informational rent from the agent in order 
to fill the gap that characterizes the vertical relationship. However the 
particular choice of the contractual arrangement might still have a role 
in shaping the magnitude of the equilibrium distortion induced by infor-
mation asymmetries, and therefore the characterization of final alloca-
tions. With (imperfectly) competitive markets, the principal can volun-
tarily give up on one (or more) control tools in order to take advantage of 
the horizontal externalities existing at the downstream level (captured 
by the parameters r  and s ). In particular, when the agent is left free 
to set up their optimal level of effort, he would be able to respond more 
efficiently to competition and hence affect the market behavior of the 
competing structure. Conditional on the existence of effort spillovers 
and some degree of differentiability between the goods, this in turn may 
drive the integrated structure to behave in a more friendly manner at the 
market stage, and overcompensate the agency cost effect arising from the 
foregone price control. 
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5. The vertically integrated structure.
Since the uncertainty on the realization of the demand generates no 
incentive to deviate, the reaction function is not modified with respect 
to the complete information case (equation 3), and the distortions in the 
equilibrium demand depend exclusively on the cross-effects from the com-
petitor’s behavior and effort choices over the allocation of market shares. 
6. The hierarchy.
Under asymmetric information, the principal is faced with the following 
optimization program: 
P t t










. . : ( ) ≥
: ( ) ≥ | ,





where U ( )q q |  indicates the q -type agent’s utility from entering the con-
tract and falsely reporting q q ≠ . Remarkably, under this standard version 
of the problem, only the high-demand agent has an incentive to misreport 
his type, so as to take advantage of the resulting lower costs of effort: the 
relevant constraints for the optimal contracting problem under asymmet-
ric information are then represented by the q -agent’s incentive constraint 
and the q -agent’s participation constraint, which must be binding at the 
optimum9. Appendixes A and B report the derivation of the IC constraints 
of the q -type agent in the presence of QF and RPM contracts, respectively. 
7. Quantity fixing.
As the agent observes the demand parameter, his utility is still given by (5) 
and the following first- and second-order conditions on the optimal level 






( ) = ( )1  (12)
and 




9 This is a standard argument from the theory of incentives (e.g., Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002).
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Using the agent’s informational rent to pin down the level of the transfer 
and the IC constraint of the high-demand type, the principal’s problem is 





[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]q q q r q q q+ − +( ) − ( ) .e q q q eΨ  (14)
where ∆ : = −q q q
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )q q q . 







( ) ( )
q











( ) ( ) ( )
q




∆ + ∆( )
.  (16)
Apparently, the quantity sold in the downstream market is a function of 
the demand parameter, as well as of the effort exerted by the agent and 
the quantity offered by the competitor, whose effects are governed by the 
existing relationship between the two final goods. 
While the optimal choice of effort is unaltered with respect to the com-
plete information scenario, the principal is forced to introduce a distor-
tion in the production level assigned to the low-type agent q  to weaken 
the informational rent obtained by the high-demand type q  when he 
misreports his private information. The magnitude and the sign of this 
distortion depend on both the extent of the asymmetric information prob-
lem and the production decisions of the vertically integrated structure in 
any possible state of demand. This alteration, in turn, rebounds both on 
the competitor’s market share (via the cross effect of r  and s ) and on the 
effort choice of the low-demand agent, since the optimally chosen level of 
effort is a linear function of quantity10. Hence, the information rent does 
not depend exclusively on the level of production requested from the lat-
ter, and the sign of the distortion need not be negative for any parameter-
10 Appendix E reports the equilibrium allocation under QF contracts.
P e q q q e q q
Q
q




: + − +( ) − ( ) − ( ) ∆ + ∆max [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q q q q rΨ 2 ( ) ]q( ) +
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ization of the model. This finding is clearly affected by the assumption of 
competitive downstream market and by the interaction between adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The following Lemma clarifies the circum-
stances under which, at the second best optimum, the menu of contracts 
involves a downturn output distortion for the low-type agent: 
Lemma 1. Let qQ
1




0( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q> ⇔ ∆ + ∆ >
Proof. – See Appendix E. 
A direct implication of Lemma 1 is the monotonicity of the second-best 
schedule of outputs under the reported condition11. 
8. Resale Price Maintenance.
As the agent (retailer) acts as the informed player, equation (10) can be 
readily exploited to derive the first-order conditions with respect to price 
and quantity12: 
q e1 q q( ) = ( )( )′Ψ
and 
p e1 q q( ) = ( )( ),′Ψ
from which we obtain: 
 q p e1 1q q y q( ) = ( ) = ( ).  (17)
The principal’s optimization program can be written as (see Appendix D): 
P e q q q e e
R
q e




: + − +( ) − ( ) − ( ) −
,
max [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )q q q r q q q qΨ Ψ Ψ( ( )e q −
∆ + ∆( ) + + − + − ( ) .q r q q q q r q q qq e q q q e2 1 2 1
1
2
( ) )] [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ]Ψ  (18)
11 However, as it will be made clear in the following, the monotonicity requirement 
is not necessary for the omitted IC constraint to be satisfied at the second best opti-
mum. See Appendix I.
12 The second-order condition is the same as under QF, see (13).
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Under RPM contracts, the downstream agent faces a retail price target, 
and is then forced to choose a suboptimal effort level from his viewpoint. 
A nonzero information rent engenders a distortion in the level of effort 
– and not in the quantity to be produced – of the agent who faces a low 
state of demand. Again, the actual sign of the effort distortion relies on 
the uncertainty about the realization of demand and the cross-effect of 
such uncertainty on the quantity sold by the vertically integrated struc-
ture. In equilibrium, the optimal effort decision will influence the out-
put produced by the low-demand type, whereas the optimal effort exerted 
by the high-demand type as well as his output level will attain their first 
best levels13. 
Intuitively, this mechanism – which works differently under the two con-
tractual arrangements – makes it less profitable the false revelation of the 
agent’s private information. We summarize the foregoing argument with 
the following: 
Proposition 2. When the high-demand type has an incentive to misreport, 
the low-demand type will face an output distortion under either contrac-
tual regime. This distortion will be negative as long as ∆ + ∆ >q r qq
2
0( ) . 
For any model parameterization – in particular, for any degree of down-
stream market externalities – either contractual regime (QF versus RPM) 
is able to induce self-selection at equilibrium. Hence, the standard second-
best contract inducing fully separating allocations will be implementable, 
even when the retail price is not contracted upon. As we are going to show, 
13 The equilibrium allocation with RPM contracts is reported in Appendix F.
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this is no longer the case when the agency relationship features counter-
vailing incentives, as the latter crucially alter the revelation strategies of 
the privately informed agent. 
It is worth emphasizing that this neutrality result – i.e., the choice between 
complete or incomplete contracts has identical ex-post implications with 
respect to truthful information disclosure – rests on our assumption of 
costless design of each contractual mode. Complete contracts are gener-
ally known to be more costly to design and/or to enforce. Since our sub-
sequent analysis suggests that the principal’s interests are best served by 
offering incomplete contracts when countervailing incentives matter, con-
sidering costly design of (more) complete contracts would unambiguously 
strengthen our findings. 
5. CONTRACTING UNDER COUNTERVAILING 
INCENTIVES
5.1. Countervailing incentives
This section studies the incidence of countervailing incentives (CI) on 
the revelation strategies of agents in order to obtain new intuitions on 
the optimal design of contractual arrangements. To this end, we slightly 
modify our basic framework of analysis to allow for type-specific outside 
opportunities. The assumption of identical (type-independent) reservation 
utilities, while greatly simplifying the analysis, often appears unrealistic. 
As pointed out, among others, by Jullien (2000), it is highly likely that an 
efficient agent (e.g., in terms of productivity or production costs) enjoys 
better outside opportunities than those faced by an inefficient one, both 
in the current relationship (or in a hypothetical continuation of the lat-
ter) and in alternative ones14. As a consequence, informational rent may 
prove nonmonotonic over the type space (e.g., Jullien, 2000)15. We intro-
14 See Laffont and Martimort (2002) for several economically significant instances of 
countervailing incentives models.
15 In this respect, Jullien (2000) identifies three relevant economic contexts in which 
an agent’s reservation utility is affected by his type: i) when two principals com-
peting for signing an exclusive deal with an agent, the offer made by one of them 
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duce type-dependent reservation utilities by positing the following partic-
ipation constraints for q ∈Θ : 
PC U( ) ( )q q: ≥ 0
PC U U( ) ( )q q: ≥ >0 0
U q q
CI
0 2 1> ∆ + ∆( )q r q q( ) ( )
where the superscript CI  stands for countervailing incentives, and denotes 
the equilibrium allocation for the contractual problem under type-depend-
ent outside opportunities. Formally, the latter restriction is imposed to 
ensure that misreporting incentives also arise for the low-demand type. 
As Laffont and Martimort (2002) argue, type-dependent participation con-
straints may alter the natural ordering of the incentive and participa-
tion constraints which characterizes the standard asymmetric informa-
tion case. In particular, under a sufficiently high reservation utility for 
the q -agent, participation of the latter in the contract may require bet-
ter contractual terms which in turn become attractive for the low-demand 
type, who may now benefit from a strictly positive rent. As an example, 
consider the case where (screened) low-demand agents are precluded from 
participating into future relationships. If the gains from the possibility 
of future cooperation are sufficiently large, the low-demand agent may 
be induced to misreport his type to gain from repeated negotiations with 
the up-stream producer. In such a situation, (optimal) contract design is 
especially problematic as the set of incentive feasible contracts may be 
severely restricted: optimal contracting may require taking into account 
many non-trivial constraints, whose bearing may distort the second-best 
allocation further away from the first-best one (e.g., Jullien, 2000). 
However, it is plausible to conjecture that a similar scenario generates also 
a countervailing effect on the high-demand type’s revelation strategies as 
determines the agent’s outside opportunity in the negotiation process with the 
other; ii) when the principal requires the agent to implement transaction-specific 
investments, the ability of the latter to engage in an alternative relationship and his 
negotiation power can be significantly reduced; iii) when the parties can renegotiate 
the original agreement, the agent’s reservation utility is conditioned by the level of 
utility granted by the original contract.
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AS A SCREENING DEVICE
REVUE D ’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 147  ➻  3 E TR IMESTRE 2014 165
the latter might want to voluntarily give up some of the information rent 
– which would result in the current relationship from misreporting – to 
take part into the continuation game and obtain a strictly positive payoff. 
The latter remark can be exploited for the optimal design of the incentive 
mechanism: if the gain from subsequent negotiations is sufficiently large 
to induce misreporting from the low-demand type, it should also counter-
balance the high-demand type’s incentive to untruthful revelation in the 
current relationship. Hence, the principal finds it not profitable to dis-
tort allocative efficiency with the aim of reducing the informational rent 
of the high-demand agent, which is bounded from below by his reserva-
tion utility, and conjectures that the relevant constraints for the contract-
ing problem are represented by the high-demand agent’s PC and the low-
demand one’s IC constraint. We label this mechanism – under which only 
high-demand type’s production level is distorted – as the simple CI-adjusted 
second-best contract (e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 2002). 
We show that the actual effects of countervailing incentives on the equi-
librium set crucially depend on the degree of contractual incompleteness. 
In particular, we establish that the use of QF contracts can always ensure 
self-selection under CI. In the presence of an RPM contractual regime, by 
contrast, the standard second-best contract adjusted for the presence of 
CI fails to be incentive-compatible under several parameterizations of the 
model; as a consequence, fully separating allocations – if existing – will be 
characterized by a larger distortion from the first-best ones. 
5.2. Comparison of the two structures
9. The vertically integrated structure.
For any q ∈Θ  and pair e qq q( ) ( ){ }1 , the optimization program is the 
same as in the case of standard distortion and then leads to the same reac-
tion functions (4). 
10. The hierarchy.
To show that the principal can exploit contractual incompleteness as a 
screening device in the presence of CI, we follow the standard route of con-
sidering the PC of the high-demand type and the IC constraint of the low-
demand type as the only relevant constraints for the contractual problem. 
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It will then be checked ex post, using the resulting allocation(s), that only 
QF contracts are able to ensure always – i.e., under any parameterization 
of the model – that the omitted constraints are satisfied. 
11. Quantity Fixing.
It is straightforward to note that the first- and second-order conditions for 
the optimal level of effort are unaltered and coincide with (12) and (13). 
The auxiliary program of the principal can be written as follows (see 
Appendix D): 
P e q q q e U
q




: + − +( ) − ( ) − +max [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]q q q r q q qΨ
 
The reaction functions associated with the previous problem are given, for 
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and 
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12. Resale Price Maintenance.
The level of effort exerted by the agent is still obtained from the inverse 
demand function (1), and hence remains identical to that derived in the 
complete information case, as does the agent’s expected utility. The auxil-
iary program of the principal is then (see Appendix D): 
P e q q q e U
R
q e




: + − +( ) − ( ) −
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[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q q+ − +( ) − ( ) −e q q q eΨ




1 2 1 0 2 1[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q q q r q q+ − +( ) − ( ) − − ∆ + ∆( )e q q q e U q qΨ ( ) .]
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5.3. Second-best allocations
For the purpose of the analysis, let us assume for the moment that sys-
tems (23)-(24) and (26)-(28) fully characterize second-best equilibrium allo-
cations under the QF and RPM regime, respectively16. 
When no vertical price control exists (QF contract), the low-demand type 
agent is imposed the first-best production quantity while the quantity for 
the high-demand type proves distorted. This finding is perfectly in line 
with the contracting literature dealing with countervailing incentives 
(e.g., Laffont and Martimort, 2002), where an upward distortion for the 
efficient type is needed to squeeze the costly rent captured by the ineffi-
cient one. 
Remarkably, this distortion involves an indirect effect on the actual level 
of effort of the high-demand type, which stems from an independent 
adjustment of the retailer to the requested allocation rather than from a 
direct contractual provision17. 
16 To this end, we should verify ex post that the omitted constraints from the auxiliary 
programs studied in the previous sections, i.e. those (assumed) not relevant for the 
contractual problem, are indeed not violated. This will be at the core of our analysis 
in the following section.
17 The equilibrium allocation with QF contracts in the presence of CI is reported in 
Appendix G.
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As in the standard asymmetric information case, by exploiting RPM con-
tracts the principal relies on the effort requirement rather than on quan-
tity provisions to extract the informational rent. However, the pres-
ence of CI induces an effort distortion for the high-demand type, that 
indirectly brings about a shift (in the same direction) of the quantity 
required to the latter18. 
We summarize the foregoing arguments in the following: 
Proposition 3. Irrespective of the contractual arrangement in place19, 
when the low-demand agent has an incentive to misreport his type, the 
high-demand type will face an output distortion under either contractual 
regime. This distortion will be positive as long as ∆ + ∆ >q r qq
2
0( ) . 
6. CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS 
AND SCREENING
This section discusses the nexus between the degree of contractual com-
pleteness and the characterization of equilibria. To this end, we identify 
the precise circumstances under which a less binding arrangement such 
as the QF contract grants the principal efficiency gains – arising from its 
screening ability – which balance the loss incurred from relinquishing on 
an available monitoring tool. 
The next propositions posit the main findings of our analysis: 
Proposition 4. In the presence of standard distortion, 
U U( ) ( )q q q q q≥ | ∀ , ∈  Θ , irrespective of the elected contractual 
arrangement. 
Proof. – See Appendix I. 
18 The equilibrium allocation with RPM contracts in the presence of CI is reported in 
Appendix H.
19 That is, irrespective of whether the principal exercises direct control on the quan-
tity or rather (trough vertical price control) on the effort requirement.
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The interpretation of this result is straightforward. Under standard dis-
tortion, the low-demand type has no incentive to misrepresent his private 
information, as claiming to cope with a high level of demand, he would 
need to exert a level of effort which proves different from the optimal one 
and hence incur into excessive losses. This effect is further amplified when 
the distortion introduced by the principal generates an underproduction 
equilibrium result for the low-demand type. As a consequence, regardless 
of the contractual arrangement employed by the principal, truthful infor-
mation disclosure represents an optimal strategy for the agent operating 
in a market characterized by a low realization of demand and no incentive 
mechanism for correct reporting is needed. 
Proposition 5. In the presence of countervailing incentives, 
U U( ) ( )q q q q q≥ | ∀ , ∈  Θ  obtains:
• for any model’s parameterization, with QF contracts;


















, with RPM contracts20. 
Proof. – See Appendix L. 
The incentive effect for the revelation strategies of agents is strongly 
influenced by the choice of the contractual regime. With QF contracts, 
the agent has no bounds on the level of effort to exert, given the quan-
tity required in the contract. In this case, the distortion in the equilib-
rium quantity of the high-demand retailer has the same effect of the 
standard distortion introduced in the second best contract: when the 
gap between the production levels associated with the two possible states 
of nature changes, the informational rent enjoyed by the agent under 
false revelation is modified accordingly. In fact, when the retailer is 
left free to select the optimal level of effort, the gain from lowering 
the effort exertion are outweighed by the gain resulting from a more 
advantageous distribution of market shares. Since the agent is residual 
claimant of the outcome of the extra-production activities intended to 
increase the demand in the retail market, a strong incentive exists to 
exert a larger level of effort. 
20 Given the assumed ranges for the involved parameters and the SOC (13), this restric-
tion can hold true only when r > 0  and s < − /1 2  or when r < 0  and s > /1 2 .
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In the case of RPM contracts, by contrast, the level of effort exercised by the 
agent is indirectly controlled by the principal and cannot be modified by 
the former. Under these circumstances, the revelation strategy of the high-
demand type is ambiguous and truthful information disclosure obtains if 
and only if the net gain from exerting a higher level of effort outperforms 
the informational rent from misreporting; conversely, when the exertion 
of a lower level of effort allows a reduction of the associated disutility, false 
revelation can grant a higher profit that might counterbalance the poten-
tial loss arising from non-participation in the subsequent relationship(s). 
This condition in turn relies on the (private or cooperative) nature of the 
effort and the market relation between the competing goods. 
Specifically, when r  and s  have the same sign, the gains from a more 
profitable allocation of market shares exceed the costs from effort disutil-
ity, and truthful revelation occurs. Intuitively, when the goods are com-
plement and the effort has a cooperative nature ( r > 0  and s > 0 ) or 
when the goods are substitutes and the effort has a private nature ( r < 0  
and s < 0 ), the (contractual) imposition of a higher level of effort posi-
tively affects downstream market competition, and hence does not pre-
vent truthful revelation21. 
On the other hand, when r  and s  have opposite sign, a higher level of 
effort adversely impacts the agents’ reporting incentives. With comple-
ment goods ( r > 0 ) and private effort (s < 0 ), the effort-induced effect 
on market competition might fail to balance the increased effort disutil-
ity. This holds true, a fortiori, when goods are substitute and the effort 
has cooperative nature ( r < 0 , s > 0 ). In this case, by distorting the high-
type effort choice in order to induce truthful revelation on the low-type’s 
part, RPM arrangements dramatically alter the revelation strategies of the 
former, who might in fact benefit from misreporting. 
In the standard asymmetric information environment with substitute 
goods ( r < 0 ) and cooperative effort (s > 0 ), the strategic effect of QF 
21 As shown in Martimort and Piccolo (2010), QF contracts are more profitable for the 
principal than RPM ones. In fact, since products are differentiated and efforts gener-
ate demand spillovers, the strategic effect induced by the choice of a QF regime becomes 
increasingly relevant when market and effort externalities have the same sign. Hence, 
even when RPM arrangements can be used to separate different types of agents, the 
principal may still wish to exploit QF contracts to set up the hierarchical relationship.
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contracts generates a stronger market reaction from the competing struc-
ture as long as the consumers’ willingness to pay increases due to the 
demand-enhancing effect of effort. Martimort and Piccolo (2010) establish 
that, under these circumstances, the principal strictly prefers the RPM 
arrangement over the QF one. Our results show that, in the free-riding 
context sr < 0 , the principal’s interests might be best served by QF con-
tracts when the disutility of effort is sufficiently high and countervailing 
incentives matter, as the latter ultimately influence the revelation strate-
gies of privately informed retailers. 
The following proposition summarizes our main finding: 












, the simple CI-adjusted 
contract is not incentive-compatible. 
When the agent’s effort choices are (indirectly) determined by contractual 
provisions, retailers may prove unable to take advantage of the positive 
externalities prevailing in the downstream market, and hence choose to 
falsely report his type. As a consequence, (more) complete contracts may 
well fail to induce fully separating allocations, and hence impose further 
distortions from the first-best to satisfy incentive-compatibility, exacer-
bating the efficiency loss of the transaction. 
This simple result can also be related to the notion of ratchet effect (e.g., 
Baron and Besanko, 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1988). When defining his rev-
elation strategies, the agent anticipates the possibility that the principal 
may use the information disclosed to design a new continuation equilib-
rium for the subsequent relationship(s); hence, a truthful revelation in 
the first period may nullify the informative advantage of the agent in all 
the possible following phases of the game. When no informative advan-
tage in the second period is related to the agent’s type, participation in the 
subsequent relationship(s) cannot compensate for the loss generated by the 
non-optimal level of effort exerted in the first one and, hence, untruthful 
disclosure can still configure a dominant strategy22. 
22 A fortiori, the same consideration applies for the case of QF contracts. In this case, 
however, the agent is residual claimant of the benefits from the demand-enhancing 
activities, and hence can still obtain positive profits from all the relationships while 
not enjoying any informative advantage in the subsequent one(s).
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7. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the screening role of incomplete contracts in a simple 
producer-retailer economy characterized by asymmetric information. As 
a main result, it is shown that the design of the contractual arrangement 
has an inherent strategic value as ascreening device when countervailing 
incentives arise in vertical contracting. This finding emphasizes a novel 
aspect of the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts within compet-
ing vertical inter-firm relationships. As argued in Martimort and Piccolo 
(2010), simple contracts are widespread business practice in these environ-
ments, as they often involve delegation of marketing activities to retailers, 
or lack restricting clauses that would endow manufacturers with force-
ful tools of vertical control within the agency relationship. These authors 
show that less complete arrangements may be more profitable when some 
aspects of the agents’ activity are non-contractible. We complement this 
finding by establishing that, when countervailing incentives play a role in 
the underlying agency relationship, the choice of the contractual regime 
also matters for the nature of the underlying equilibrium outcome. 
Vertical contracts based on retail price control are well-understood as use-
ful devices to handle information free-riding by retailers or to help deal 
with double-marginalization issues. As a policy implication, our analysis 
rather suggests some caution on the employment of such type of arrange-
ments within complex industry relationships which may be plagued by 
countervailing incentives issue (e.g., Jullien, 2000). Whilst framed in a 
stylized manufacturer-retailer model economy, this result might support 
the use of simpler contracts in more complex environments characterized 
by vertical (contractual) and horizontal externalities (e.g., procurement 
contracting). 
The model is written in the simplest form that still conveys the key mes-
sage. A twofold robustness check for our findings would require extend-
ing the analysis of incomplete contracting to the continuous-type case 
and to the possibility of renegotiation. In fact, as argued in Hermalin and 
Katz (1993), literally incomplete contracts may have no effects when they 
are not renegotiation-proof. Also, the scope for repeated negotiations and 
its impact on the strategic value of contractual incompleteness should be 
thoroughly examined. Apparently, any strategic advantage of incomplete 
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over complete agreements will rely on the interplay between the basic 
ingredients of the dynamic model, i.e. type correlation, the magnitude of 
the discount rate and the possibility of renegotiation. We leave this and 
other related issues to future research. 
APPENDIX
13. Appendix A: Derivation of the IC constraints with QF contracts
Given the agent’s utility function (6), the IC constraint is: 
IC e q q q e t
e
q q q q r q q q q
q q




[( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )]− + ( ) − − ,q q q e t1 2 1q r q q q q   Ψ
where q  represents the actual realization of demand and q  denotes the 
false agent’s report. Hence, the high-demand agent’s IC constraint is: 
IC e q q q e t
e q
( ) [( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )]
[( ( )
q q q q r q q q q
q q
: + − + − −
≥ + −
1 2 1 Ψ
1 2 1( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )]q r q q q q+ − − .q q e tΨ
The left-hand side is the utility from truthful type revelation. The right-
hand side can be rewritten as a function of the low-demand agent’s utility 
and of a term capturing the scope and impact of the asymmetric distribu-
tion of information, i.e.: 
 U U q qQ Q
1 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q≥ + ∆ + ∆( ) .  (29)
It must be emphasized that the term ∆ + ∆q r qq
2
( )  captures two dis-
tinct features of the model: first, the standard information rent, that the 
q -agent benefits from thanks to his ability to possibly mimic the low-
demand type; second, the information rent which stems from the com-
petitive environment in which the retailer operates, and represented by 
the differences in the competitor’s production levels with respect to the 
different states of natures q ∈Θ . Remarkably, even when the contract 
entails a non-zero quantity for the low-demand type, i.e. q
1
0( )q > , the 
overall term capturing the information rent problem need not be strictly 
positive for any parameterization of the model. 
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Similarly, the low-demand agent’s IC constraint is: 
  U U q qQ Q( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q≥ − ∆ + ∆( ) .2 1  (30)
14. Appendix B: Derivation of the IC constraints with RPM contracts
The generic formulation of the IC constraint is: 
IC p q p q q t
p q
q q q q q r q q q
q q
( ) : ( ) ( ) − ( ) + ( ) − ( ) −( ) − ( )
≥
1 1 1 1 2
1 1
Ψ
( ) ( )  − + − ( ) − − .Ψ( ( ) ( ) ) ( )p q q t1 1 2q q r q q q  
The high-demand agent’s IC can be written as: 
IC p q p q q t
p q
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( )
( ) ( )
q q q q q r q q q
q q
: − + − − −
≥ −
1 1 1 1 2
1 1
Ψ
Ψ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( )p q q t1 1 2q q r q q q+ − − − ,
or 
 U U e e qR R( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )q q q q q r q≥ + ( ) − − ∆ + ∆( ).Ψ Ψ 2  (31)
Similarly, the low-demand agent’s IC constraint is: 
 U U e e qR R( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )q q q q q r q≥ + ( ) − + ∆ + ∆( )Ψ Ψ 2  (32)
15. Appendix C: Derivation of the principal’s program with QF contracts
Using (6) and considering the two possible realizations of demand, the 
principal’s constrained optimization program is 
P e q q q e U
Q
q






: + − +( ) − ( ) − +
⋅( )
max [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]q q q r q q q qΨ
[( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( ) ( )
q q q r q q q q
q q
+ − + − ( ) −
. . , ,
e q q q e U
s t PC PC
1 2 1
Ψ
IC IC( ) ( )q q, .
The auxiliary program under standard distortion (9) is obtained by insert-
ing the high-demand agent’s informational rent (28) and assuming that 
the low-demand agent receives a null rent. By the same token, the aux-
iliary program under CI (21) is obtained by using the low-demand type’s 
informational rent (30) – with U UQ ( )q ≥ 0  – and letting the high-demand 
agent have a null rent. 
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16. Appendix D: Derivation of the principal’s program with RPM 
contracts
Using (13), the principal’s program is given by: 
P e q q q e U
R
q e




: + − +( ) − ( ) −
⋅( ), ⋅( )
max [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (q q q r q q q qΨ )]
[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( )
+





q q q r q q q q
q
e q q q e U
s t PC P
Ψ
C IC IC( ) ( ) ( )q q q, , .
Substituting (31) into this generic formulation program and assuming 
away the informational rent of the low-demand agent, one obtains the 
principal’s program in the case of standard distortion (16), while the anal-
ogous under CI (24) is obtained using (32) and assuming that the the high-
demand agent’s rent is represented by his reservation utility (U0 0> ).
17. Appendix E: Equilibrium with QF contracts and standard distortion
The second best allocation, expressed as a function of the first best one, 
is obtained using the reaction functions of the integrated structure (4) 
and those of the hierarchical relationship (10) and (11), as well as the first-
order condition with respect to effort (7)23. 
 q qSB FB
1 1
( ) ( )q q= ,  (33)
 q qSB FB
1 1 2 2
2 2 1 2
4 2 2 1





y yr rs rs y yr
= −
∆ + −
− − − − + +
,  (34)
 e eSB FB( ) ( )q q= ,  (35)





y yr rs rs y yr
= −
∆ + −
− − − − + +
,
2 2 1 2
4 2 2 12 2
 (36)
 q qSB FB2 2( ) ( )q q= ,  (37)
 q qSB FB2 2 2 2
2 1 2
4 2 2
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )(
q q
s yr r y
y yr rs rs y yr
= −
∆ + + −
− − − − + +1)
.  (38)
23 To isolate the effects of information asymmetries, the possible realizations of q  are 
centered around 1 , i.e. q = + ∆1  and q = − ∆1 , assuming ∆ = ∆ / <q 2 1 .
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Notice that: 
∆ + ∆( ) = −( ) +( )∆















0 2 1 0( ) ( )q q
r y
y sr yr
y sr yr− =
+( )∆
− − −( ) > ⇔ − − −( ) > .
This proves Lemma 1 in the main text. 
18. Appendix F: Equilibrium with RPM contracts and standard distortion 
Equilibrium effort and quantity with RPM contracts, obtained using (4) 
and (17)-(20), are given by: 
   q qSB FB
1 1
( ) ( )q q= ,  (39)
q q
SB FB
1 1 2 2
2 2 2 1 2
4 2 3 4
( ) ( )




y yr rs sr y r
= −
∆ + + −




   e eSB FB( ) ( )q q= ,  (41)
e e
SB FB( ) ( )




y yr rs sr y r y
= −
∆ − + −
− − − − + +
2 1 2 2 2
4 2 3 4
2




   q qSB FB2 2( ) ( )q q= ,  (43)
q q
SB FB
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2
4 2 3 4
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )(
q q
y s r r
y yr rs sr y r
= −
∆ − + +




19. Appendix G: Equilibrium with QF contracts and CI
Equilibrium effort and quantity are obtained by using the reaction func-
tions of the two competitors (4), (22) and (23) and the first order condition 
with respect to effort (7): 
 q qCI FB
1 1 2 2
2 2 1 2
4 2 2 1





y yr rs sr y yr
= +
∆ + −
− − − − + +
,  (45)
 q qCI FB
1 1
( ) ( )q q= ,  (46)
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− − − − + +
,
2 2 1 2
4 2 2 12 2
 (47)
 e eCI FB( ) ( )q q= ,  (48)
 q qCI FB
2 2 2 2
2 1 2
4 2 2
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
( )(
q q
s yr r y
y yr rs sr y yr
= +
∆ + + −
− − − − + +1)
,  (49)
 q qCI FB2 2( ) ( )q q= .  (50)
20. Appendix H: Equilibrium with RPM contracts and CI
The equilibrium allocation is derived from the reaction functions of the 
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e e
CI FB( ) ( )
( )( )( )
(
q q
sr r y yr yr r r
y yr rs
= +
∆ − − + + + + −
− − −
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
4
2
2 2 4 22 2)( )yr sr r y− − − +
,  (53)






2 2 4 2 2 2 2
4 2
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,  (55)
 q qCI FB2 2( ) ( )q q= .  (56)
21. Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 4
Under standard distortion, the principal takes into account the high-
demand agent’s IC constraint when designing the contract and verifies ex 
post that the low-demand agent’s IC constraint is not violated. The latter 
is given by: 
q q q q
1 2 1 2
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q r q q q r q∆ + ∆( ) − ∆ + ∆( ) ≤ .
or equivalently, using the equilibrium level of effort and quantity: 
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− + +( )
≥ ,
which is always satisfied given the assertion of Lemma 1. 
With RPM contracts, the IC constraint for the low-demand agent is: 
Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψe e q e e q( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q r q q q q r q( ) − − ∆ + ∆( )( ) + ( ) − + ∆ + ∆( )( ) ≤2 2 0,
or equivalently, using the equilibrium level of effort and quantity: 






y y y r
sr y r yr
−( ) +( ) +( ) ∆
− + + +( )
≥ .
The latter is always satisfied given (8). 
22. Appendix L: Proof of Proposition 5
In the case of CI, the principal takes into account the low-demand agent’s 
IC constraint when designing the contract and verifies ex post that the 
high-demand agent’s IC constraint is not violated. 
With QF contracts, the latter is given by: 
q q q q
1 2 1 2
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q r q q q r q∆ + ∆( ) − ∆ + ∆( ) ≤ ,
and using the equilibrium quantities (45), (46), (49) and ( 50): 








−( ) +( ) ∆
− + +( )
≥ ,
which always holds true given (8). 
With RPM contracts, the high-demand type’s IC constraints is: 
Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψe e q e e q( ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) )q q q r q q q q r q( ) − + ∆ + ∆( ) + ( ) − − ∆ + ∆( ) ≤2 2 0,
and using the equilibrium level of effort and quantity for the vertically 
integrated structure, (53) and (56), it can be written as: 
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